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Abstract
Two complementary mathematical models for attitude formation are considered:
Starting from the model of Weidlich and Haag (1983), which assumes indirect
interactions that are mediated by a mean field, a new model is proposed, which is
characterized by direct pair interactions. Three types of pair interactions leading to
attitude changes can be found: First, changes by some kind of avoidance behavior.
Second, changes by a readiness for compromises. Third, changes by persuasion.
Different types of behavior are distinguished by introducing several subpopulations.
Representative solutions of the model are illustrated by computational results.
Key Words: attitude formation, direct interactions, indirect interactions, mean field, master
equation, probability distribution of attitudes, persuasion, avoidance behavior, compromises,
oscillatory attitude changes, frequency locking, interacting populations.
Type of Article: mathematical model and theory.
Dimensions and Units: transition probabilities per unit time (transition rates); and others.
1 Introduction and Summary
In the field of attitude research there is a broad and substantial literature available (see
e.g. Fishbein & Ajzen (1975), Petty & Cacioppo (1986) for an overview). Espe-
cially, some formal models have been developed like Osgood and Tannenbaum’s (1955)
congruity principle, Heider’s (1946) balance theory or Festinger’s (1957) dissonance
theory. These models deal with the stability of attitude structures and the probabilities
for special types of of attitude changes.
In contrast, this paper shall treat general mathematical models for the change of the
fraction of individuals having a certain attitude i. Such models are of great interest for
a quantitative understanding of attitude formation, and, especially, for the prognosis of
trends in the public opinion (e.g. of tendencies in the behavior of voters or consumers).
Coleman’s (1964) diffusion model was one of the first quantitative models of this kind. It
1
already distinguished two different types of attitude changes: First, changes by direct in-
teractions. Second, externally induced changes. Later, Bartholomew (1967) developed
a stochastic model for the spread of rumors.
The most advanced model has been introduced by Weidlich (Weidlich (1972), Weid-
lich & Haag (1983)), which has been seized by some authors in one or another mod-
ification (e.g. Troitzsch (1989), Schweitzer et. al. (1991)). It is based on a master
equation (a stochastic formulation), which assumes attitude changes to occur with a cer-
tain probability per unit time (sect. 2). Whereas Weidlich and Haag (1983) assumed
attitude changes by indirect interactions (which could only describe attitude changes via
the media or the spirit of age) (sect. 2), the author thinks that attitude changes by di-
rect interactions (due to conversations or discussions) are of special interest. Therefore, a
modified master equation is introduced in section 3, which allows to examine the effects of
pair interactions (dyadic interactions). From this master equation, certain rate equations
for the temporal development of the attitude distribution can be derived (sect. 3).
Three types of of attitude changes by pair interactions can be found (sect. 3): First,
an avoidance behavior, causing an individual to change the attitude if meeting another
individual with the same attitude (defiant behavior, snob effect). Second, a readiness
for compromises. Third, the tendency to take over the opinion of another individual by
persuasion. All three types of attitude changes may, in the course of time, lead to stable
equilibrium fractions of the attitudes, which depend on the preferences for them. However,
there may also appear more complex attitude changes which could not be predicted solely
by qualitative analyses, for example, oscillatory or chaotic attitude changes.
In section 4, possible solutions of the model are examined by considering representative
cases. By distinguishing several subpopulations (e.g. blue and white collars), different types
of behavior are taken into account. The mutual influence of the subpopulations is assumed
to depend on their mutual sympathy.
2 Indirect interactions
In the following we shall shortly discuss the modell of Weidlich and Haag. For a more
detailled description see Weidlich (1972) and Weidlich & Haag (1983).
Suppose we have a system consisting of N individuals. These individuals can normally be
divided into A subpopulations a consisting of Na individuals, i.e.
A∑
a=1
Na = N . (1)
By subpopulations a, different social groups (e.g. blue and white collars) or different
characteristic types a of behavior are distinguished with respect to the situation of interest
(e.g. the voting behavior). The Na individuals of each subpopulation a are distributed over
several states
~x ∈ {~x1, . . . , ~xSa} . (2)
Being in state
~x := (~r, i) (3)
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means being at place ~r and having the attitude i concerning the question of interest
(e.g. “Which political party i would you vote for, if there were elections today?”). If the
occupation number na~x denotes the number of individuals of type a being in state ~x, we
have the relation ∑
~x
na~x ≡
Sa∑
s=1
na~xs = Na . (4)
Let
~n := (n1~x1 , . . . , n
1
~xS1
; . . . ;nA~x1, . . . , n
A
~xSA
) = (~n1; . . . ;~nA) (5)
be the vector consisting of all occupation numbers na~x. This vector is called the socio-
configuration, since it contains all information about the distribution of the N individuals
over the states ~xs. P (~n, t) shall denote the probability to find the socio-configuration ~n at
time t. This implies
0 ≤ P (~n, t) ≤ 1 and
∑
~n
P (~n, t) = 1 . (6)
If transitions from socio-configuration ~n to ~n′ occur with a probability of P (~n′, t+∆t|~n, t)
during a short time interval ∆t, we have a (relative) transition rate of
w(~n′, ~n; t) = lim
∆t→0
P (~n′, t+∆t|~n, t)
∆t
. (7)
The absolute transition rate of changes from ~n to ~n′ is the product w(~n′, ~n; t)P (~n, t) of the
probability P (~n, t) to have the configuration ~n and the relative transition rate w(~n′, ~n; t)
if having the configuration ~n. Whereas the inflow into ~n is given as the sum over all
absolute transition rates of changes from an arbitrary configuration ~n′ to ~n, the outflow
from ~n is given as the sum over all absolute transition rates of changes from ~n to another
configuration ~n′. Since the temporal change of the probability P (~n, t) is determined by
the inflow into ~n reduced by the outflow from ~n, we find the master equation
d
dt
P (~n, t) = inflow into ~n − outflow from ~n
=
∑
~n′
w(~n, ~n′; t)P (~n′, t)−
∑
~n′
w(~n′, ~n; t)P (~n, t) (8)
(Haken (1983)).
Weidlich and Haag (1983) have assumed the individuals to change from state ~x to
state ~x′ with a transition rate of wa(~x
′, ~x;~n; t) independently of each other. Such changes
correspond to transitions of the socio-configuration from ~n to
~na~y
a
~x := (n
1
~x1
, . . . , n1~xS1
; . . . ;na~x1 , . . . , (n
a
~y + 1), . . . , (n
a
~x − 1), . . . , n
a
~xSa
; . . . ;nA~x1, . . . , n
A
~xSA
) (9)
with a transition rate of na~xwa(~x
′, ~x;~n; t), which is proportional to the number na~x of indi-
viduals who can leave the state ~x. For w(~n′, ~n; t) we therefore have the relation
w(~n′, ~n; t) =
{
na~xwa(~x
′, ~x;~n; t) if ~n′ = ~na~y
a
~x
0 else .
(10)
Assumption (10) has sometimes been doubted to be suitable for describing social pro-
cesses, since it handles the interactions of individuals in an indirect way via the dependence
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on the occupation numbers na~x. That means, the individual interactions are mediated by
the mean field of the socio-configuration, which could model attitude changes via the
media or the spirit of the age. Figure 1 illustrates the 2N indirect interactions of N
individuals.
In contrast, this article will deal with direct interactions of individuals, which are a re-
alistic model for attitude changes in conversations or discussions. We shall consider pair
interactions only, because they are the most important ones. However, it is also possible to
develop models for simultaneous interactions of an arbitrary number of individuals (Hel-
bing (1991a)). Figure 2 depicts the N(N − 1) direct pair interactions of N individuals.
3 Direct pair interactions
A model describing direct pair interactions is given by the master equation (8), when
taking the special transition rates
w(~n′, ~n; t) =
{
na~xn
b
~yw˜ab(~x
′, ~y′; ~x, ~y; t) if ~n′ = ~na~x′
b
~y′
a
~x
b
~y
0 else ,
(11)
where
~na~x′
b
~y′
a
~x
b
~y := (. . . , (n
a
~x′ + 1), . . . , (n
a
~x − 1), . . . , (n
b
~y′ + 1), . . . , (n
b
~y − 1), . . .) . (12)
w˜ab(~x
′, ~y′; ~x, ~y; t) is the (relative) transition rate for two individuals of types a and b to
change their states from ~x and ~y to ~x′ and ~y′ due to direct interactions. The corresponding
transition rate na~xn
b
~yw˜ab(~x
′, ~y′; ~x, ~y; t) for changes of the configuration from ~n to ~na~x′
b
~y′
a
~x
b
~y is
again proportional to the numbers na~x and n
b
~y of individuals which can leave the states ~x
and ~y.
Usually, one is mostly interested in the expected fractions
Pa(~x, t) :=
〈na~x〉
Na
(13)
of individuals of type a who are in state ~x. Here, 〈na~x〉 denotes the mean value
〈na~x〉 :=
∑
~n
na~xP (~n, t) (14)
of the occupation number na~x. For Pa(~x, t) we have the relations
0 ≤ Pa(~x, t) ≤ 1 and
∑
~x
Pa(~x, t) = 1 . (15)
Pa(~x, t) can be interpreted as the probability distribution of state ~x within subpopulation
a. Since Na/N is the fraction of individuals of type a, the probability distribution P (~x, t)
of state ~x in the entire population is given by
P (~x, t) =
∑
a
Na
N
Pa(~x, t) . (16)
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The temporal development of Pa(~x, t) obeys the Boltzmann equation (Boltzmann
(1964))
d
dt
Pa(~x, t) =
∑
b
∑
~x′
∑
~y
∑
~y′
wab(~x, ~y
′; ~x′, ~y; t)Pa(~x
′, t)Pb(~y, t)
−
∑
b
∑
~x′
∑
~y
∑
~y′
wab(~x
′, ~y′; ~x, ~y; t)Pa(~x, t)Pb(~y, t)
(17a)
(17b)
with
wab := Nbw˜ab , (18)
as long as the absolute values of the (co)variances
σa~x
b
~x′ :=
∑
~n
(na~x − 〈n
a
~x〉)(n
b
~x′ − 〈n
b
~x′〉)P (~n, t) = 〈n
a
~xn
b
~x′〉 − 〈n
a
~x〉〈n
b
~x′〉 (19)
are small compared to 〈na~x〉〈n
b
~x′〉, and if (Na − 1)/Na ≈ 1 (see Helbing (1991a)). These
conditions are usually fulfilled in case of a great population size N . Equation (17) can be
also understood as exact equation for the most probable individual behavior.
The interpretation of (17) is similar to the one of the master equation (8). Again, the
temporal change of the fraction Pa(~x, t) of individuals being in state ~x is given by the
inflow (17a) into state ~x reduced by the outflow (17b) from state ~x:
d
dt
Pa(~x, t) = inflow into ~x – outflow from ~x . (20)
The inflow [resp. outflow] is given by all transitions, where individuals of type a change
their states from arbitrary states ~x′ to state ~x [resp. from state ~x to arbitrary states ~x′] due
to pair interactions with other individuals of arbitrary type b, who change their arbitrary
states ~y to arbitrary states ~y′. These pair interactions occur with a frequency proportional
to the fractions Pa and Pb of the states which are subject to a change. Since b, ~x
′, ~y and
~y′ are arbitrary, one has to carry out a summation over them.
In the following we shall consider the cases of spatially homogeneous or local attitude
formation, which are independent of ~r. Equation (17) has then the form
d
dt
Pa(i, t) =
∑
b
∑
i′
∑
j
[
w∗ab(i; i
′, j; t)Pa(i
′, t)Pb(j, t)− w
∗
ab(i
′; i, j; t)Pa(i, t)Pb(j, t)
]
, (21)
where the abbreviation
w∗ab(.; ., .; t) :=
∑
j′
wab(., j
′; ., .; t) (22)
has been used. w∗ab(i
′; i, j; t) is the rate for individuals of type a to change from attitude
i to attitude i′ due to interactions with individuals of type b having the attitude j. For
the description or prediction of concrete situations the rates w∗ab have to be determined
empirically (see Helbing (1991b)). In the following, we shall instead examine the possible
solutions of (21) by considering representative examples. Only three kinds of interaction
contribute to the temporal change of Pa(i, t):
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i′
i
←− i (i′ 6= i)
i′
j
←− i (j 6= i, i′ 6= i, i′ 6= j)
j
j
←− i (j 6= i)
(23.1)
(23.2)
(23.3)
The interpretation is obviously the following:
1. The first term describes some kind of avoidance behavior, causing an individual to
change the opinion from i to i′ with a certain probability, when meeting another
individual originally having the same opinion i. Such defiant behavior is e.g. known
as snob effect.
2. The second term represents the readiness to change the opinion from i to i′ 6= j (in
the following called a compromise), if meeting another individual having a different
opinion j 6= i. This behavior will be found, if attitude i cannot be maintained when
confronted with attitude j, but attitude j is not satisfying (for this person) either.
3. The third term describes the tendency to take over the opinion j of another indi-
vidual by persuasion.
According to this classification, the transition rates w∗ab(i
′; i, j) can be splitted into three
contributions:
w∗ab(i
′; i, j; t) = w∗1ab(i
′; i; t)δij
+ w∗2ab(i
′; i, j; t)
+ w∗3ab(j; i; t)δji′ ,
(24.1)
(24.2)
(24.3)
where
δij :=
{
1 if i = j
0 if i 6= j
(25)
is the Kronecker function and
w∗1ab(i, i) = 0, w
∗2
ab(i; i, j) = 0, w
∗2
ab(j; i, j) = 0, w
∗2
ab(i
′; i, i) = 0, w∗3ab(i; i) = 0 . (26)
Equation (21) has now the form
d
dt
Pa(i, t) =
∑
b
∑
i′
[
w∗1ab(i; i
′; t)Pa(i
′, t)Pb(i
′, t)− w∗1ab(i
′; i; t)Pa(i, t)Pb(i, t)
]
+
∑
b
∑
i′
∑
j
[
w∗2ab(i; i
′, j; t)Pa(i
′, t)Pb(j, t)− w
∗2
ab(i
′; i, j; t)Pa(i, t)Pb(j, t)
]
+
∑
b
∑
j
[
w∗3ab(i; j; t)Pa(j, t)Pb(i, t)− w
∗3
ab(j; i; t)Pa(i, t)Pb(j, t)
]
.
(27.1)
(27.2)
(27.3)
w∗kab (k = 1, 2, 3) are the contributions to the transition rates w
∗
ab by interactions of type k.
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4 Computer solutions
In order to obtain concrete results, we have to make some plausible specifications of
the model. Let κab be the degree of sympathy which individuals of type a feel towards
individuals of type b. Then one expects the following: Whereas the rate w∗2ab of the readiness
for compromises and the rate w∗3ab of the tendency to take over another opinion will be
increasing with κab, the rate w
∗1
ab of the avoidance behavior will be decreasing with κab.
This functional dependence can e.g. be described by
w∗1ab(i
′; i; t) := ν1ab(t)Ra(i
′, i; t)(1− δii′)
w∗2ab(i
′; i, j; t) := ν2ab(t)Ra(i
′, i; t)(1− δii′)(1− δij)(1− δji′)
w∗3ab(j; i; t) := ν
3
ab(t)Ra(j, i; t)(1− δij)
(28.1)
(28.2)
(28.3)
with
ν1ab(t) := ν
1
a(1− κab)
ν2ab(t) := ν
2
aκab
ν3ab(t) := ν
3
aκab
(29.1)
(29.2)
(29.3)
(0 ≤ κab ≤ 1). The factors (1−δij) are due to (26). ν
k
a is a measure for the rate of attitude
changes of type k within subpopulation a, i.e. a flexibility parameter. The rates νkab(t) can
be understood as product of the contact rate νab(t) of an individual of subpopulation a
with individuals of subpopulation b, and the frequency fkab(t) of having an interaction of
type k in case of a contact:
νkab(t) = νab(t)f
k
ab(t) . (30)
νkab has the effect of a coupling coefficient and determines, how strong attitude changes
of kind k within subpopulation a depend on the attitude distribution Pb(j, t) within
subpopulation b. Especially νkab = 0 for k = 1, 2, 3 implies, that the dynamic development
of Pa(i, t) is completely independent of Pb(j, t) (see fig. 3).
For the case of two subpopulations we explicitly have the sympathy matrix
κ ≡
(
κab
)
=
(
1 κ12
κ21 1
)
, (31)
if the sympathy between individuals belonging to the same subpopulation is assumed to
be maximal (κ11 = 1 = κ22). Then, the abbreviation
κcd :=
(
1 c
d 1
)
(32)
can be used. Figures 3 to 5 (ν31 = (S1 − 1) = 3, ν
3
2 = (S2 − 1) = 2, ν
1
a = ν
2
a = 0, R1 = R
4,
R2 = R
3) demonstrate the effects of variations of κcd. Attitudes of subpopulation a = 1
are represented by solid lines, attitudes of subpolulation a = 2 by broken lines. Figure 3
(κ = κ00) is simulated without any coupling of the subpopulations, figure 4 (κ = κ
0
1) with
asymmetric coupling and figure 5 (κ = κ11) with mutual coupling.
7
Ra(i
′, i; t) is a measure for the readiness to change the attitude from i to i′ for an individual
of type a, if an attitude change takes place. We shall assume
Ra(i, i
′; t) =
1
Sa − 1
− Ra(i
′, i; t) with 0 ≤ Ra(i
′, i; t) ≤
1
Sa − 1
, if i 6= i′ (33)
(Sa = number of different attitudes within subpopulation a). That means, the readiness
to change from opinion i′ to i will be the greater, the lower the readiness for the inverse
change from i to i′ is.
Pa,i(t) :=
∑
i′(6=i)
Ra(i, i
′; t) (34)
can be interpreted as degree of preference for opinion i (see figures 6 and 7). Since Ra(i, i; t)
is arbitrary (see (28), (33)), we may define
Ra(i, i; t) := Pa,i(t) . (35)
Usually, the equilibrium fraction will be growing with the preference Pa,i: see figure 6
(νka = Sa − 1 = 2, κ = κ
0
1, R1 = R
1, R2 = R
2), where a solid line represents the highest
preference, a dotted line the lowest preference, and a broken line medium preference. For
the special case
Pa,i = (Sa − 1)
1
2(Sa − 1)
=
1
2
, (36)
one of the stationary solutions is
Pa(i) =
1
Sa
. (37)
This is because of∑
i′(6=i)
Ra(i
′, i) =
∑
i′(6=i)
(
1
Sa − 1
−Ra(i, i
′)
)
= 1− Pa,i =
1
2
= Pa,i =
∑
i′(6=i)
Ra(i, i
′) (38)
and equations (27) to (29). An illustration of this case is given in figure 7 (νka = Sa−1 = 2,
κ = κ01, Ra = R
3).
In the following, we shall often consider the situation of three different opinions (Sa = 3):
Ra ≡
(
Ra(i
′, i)
)
:=
 Pa,1
1
Sa−1
− Aa
1
Sa−1
− Ba
Aa Pa,2
1
Sa−1
− Ca
Ba Ca Pa,3
 . (39)
(Aa is the readiness to change from attitude 1 to attitude 2, Ba to change from 1 to 3,
and Ca to change from 2 to 3.) Especially, for
Ra = R
1 :=
 0.7 0.35 0.350.15 0.5 0.35
0.15 0.15 0.3
 , (40)
attitude 1 has the highest preference (Pa,1 = 0.7), attitude 3 has the lowest preference
(Pa,3 = 0.3), and attitude 2 has medium preference (Pa,2 = 0.5). For
Ra = R
2 :=
 0.5 0.15 0.350.35 0.7 0.35
0.15 0.15 0.3
 , (41)
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attitude 3 has again the lowest preference (Pa,3 = 0.3), but attitude 2 has the highest
preference (Pa,2 = 0.7), and attitude 1 has medium preference (Pa,1 = 0.5). If
Ra = R
3 :=
 1/2 0 1/21/2 1/2 0
0 1/2 1/2
 , (42)
all attitudes have the same preference (Pa,i = 1/2). An analogous case for 4 attitudes is
given by
Ra = R
4 :=

1/2 0 1/6 1/3
1/3 1/2 0 1/6
1/6 1/3 1/2 0
0 1/6 1/3 1/2
 . (43)
However, the case of three different opinions represents the prototype of opinion formation,
since the attitudes concerning a special question can be classified within the schemes
“positive”, “negative”, “neutral” or “pro”, “contra”, “compromise”.
4.1 Avoidance behavior
In this section we shall examine the effect of avoidance behavior alone (i.e. ν1a = Sa−1 = 2,
ν2a = ν
3
a = 0). Figures 8 and 9 compare the case, where both subpopulations prefer attitude
1 (Fig. 8: κ = κ0.50.5, Ra = R
1) and where they prefer different attitudes (Fig. 9: κ = κ0.50.5,
R1 = R
1, R2 = R
2). The attitude i with the highest preference is represented by a
solid line, the attitude with the lowest preference by a dotted line, and the one with
medium preference by a broken line. Obviously, the fraction of the most prefered attitude
is decreasing, if both subpopulations favour the same attitude (see fig. 8). If they prefer
different attitudes, it is growing (see fig. 9), since there are less situations of avoidance
then.
Avoidance behavior is e.g. known as snob effect. It also occurs in the case of hostile groups.
4.2 Readiness for compromises
Let us now consider the effect of persuasion in combination with a readiness for compro-
mises (see figures 10 and 11: ν1a = 0, ν
2
a = ν
3
a = Sa − 1 = 2). For the effect of persuasion
without readiness for compromises (i.e. ν1a = ν
2
a = 0, ν
3
a = Sa− 1 = 2) see the correspond-
ing figures 12 and 13. Again, we shall compare the case, where both subpopulations prefer
attitude 1 (Fig. 10: κ = κ11, Ra = R
1), with the case, where they prefer different attitudes
(Fig. 11: κ = κ11, R1 = R
1, R2 = R
2). If both subpopulations prefer the same attitude, this
attitude will be the only surviving one (see fig. 10). The readiness for compromises will
have little influence then (compare to fig. 12: κ = κ11, Ra = R
1). However, if the subpop-
ulations favour different attitudes, the compromise (the 3rd attitude, represented by the
dotted line) will be chosen by a certain fraction of individuals (see fig. 11). According to
this, the competition between several attitudes will lead to a greater variety of attitudes,
if there is a readiness for compromises. Without this readiness (ν2a = 0), the competing
attitudes will be the only surviving ones (see fig. 13: κ = κ11, R1 = R
1, R2 = R
2). However,
they will survive in both subpopulations (at least, if w∗3ab is time independent).
9
4.3 Effects of persuasion
This section will deal with the tendency to take over the opinion j of another individual
(i.e. ν3a = Sa − 1, ν
1
a = ν
2
a = 0). Typical cases are depicted in figures 12 and 13. However,
there are also oscillations possible as shown in figures 3, 4 and 14 (κ = κ11, Ra = R
3).
In order to understand this behavior, let us consider the case of a single subpopulation
(A = 1) or of uncoupled subpopulations (κab = 0 for all a, b with a 6= b). From equations
(27c), (28c), (29c) we then obtain
d
dt
Pa(i, t) = Pa(i, t)
∑
j
Maij(t)Pa(j, t) (44)
with
Ma(t) ≡
(
Maij(t)
)
:=
(
ν3aκaa
[
Ra(i, j; t)− Ra(j, i; t)
])
. (45)
Equation (44) has at least the Sa stationary solutions
P sa (i) := δis =
{
1 if i = s
0 if i 6= s
, s = 1, . . . , Sa. (46)
A linear stability analysis with
δP sa (i, t) := Pa(i, t)− P
s
a (i) , δP
s
a (i, t)≪ 1 (47)
leads to the equations
d
dt
δP sa (i, t) =
{
−MasiδP
s
a (i, t) for i 6= s∑
j M
a
ijδP
s
a (j, t) for i = s
(48)
(where δP sa (i, t) > 0 for i 6= s, δP
s
a (s, t) = −
∑
i(6=s) δP
s
a (i, t) < 0). Therefore, the stationary
solution P sa (i) is stable if
Masi > 0 , i.e. Ra(s, i) > Ra(i, s) for every i with i 6= s. (49)
Otherwise it is unstable. Because ofMasi = −M
a
is (see (45)), there is at most one stationary
solution P la(i) stable. Attitude l will be the only surviving attitude then. If none of the
solutions P sa (i) is stable, there may exist another stationary solution P
0
a (i), which is given
by ∑
j
MaijP
0
a (j) = 0 for every i. (50)
A linear stability analysis with (47) leads to
d
dt
δP 0a (i, t) = P
0
a (i)
∑
j
MaijδP
0
a (j, t) . (51)
Since Ma is an antisymmetric matrix, i.e.(
Maji
)
= −
(
Maij
)
(52)
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(see (45)), equation (51) has only imaginary eigenvalues (May (1973)). Therefore, an
oscillatory behavior of δP 0a (i, t) and Pa(i, t) results. (52) also implies that∑
i
[
Pa(i, t)− P
0
a (i) lnPa(i, t)
]
= const., i.e.
∏
i
Pa(i, t)
P 0a (i) = const. (53)
(see May (1973)). As a consequence of (53) and (15), Pa(i, t) moves on a (Sa − 2)-
dimensional hypersurface (see figures 15, 18 and 19). Especially for Sa = 3 attitudes, we
find a cyclical movement. This can be seen in figure 15 (Ra = R
3), where simulations for
different initial values are depicted.
Let us examine the case with Ra = R
3 in detail. Ma is of the form
(
Maij
)
= ν3aκaa
 0 −1/2 1/21/2 0 −1/2
−1/2 1/2 0
 , (54)
then. As a consequence, the stationary solutions P sa (i) with s = 1, 2, 3 are unstable (see
(49)). P 0a (i) ≡ 1/Sa is another stationary solution and has imaginary eigenvalues. Equa-
tion (44) takes the form
dPa(i, t)
dt
=
ν3aκaa
Sa − 1
Pa(i, t)
[
Pa(i−1, t)−Pa(i+1, t)
]
≡ λai (t)Pa(i, t) with i ≡ i mod Sa .
(55)
λai (t) := ν
3
aκaa[Pa(i − 1, t)− Pa(i + 1, t)]/(Sa − 1) is a dynamic order parameter and can
be interpreted as time dependent growth rate. From (55) one can see the following:
• Pa(i, t) increases as long as Pa(i− 1, t) > Pa(i+ 1, t), i.e. λ
a
i (t) > 0.
• The growth of Pa(i, t) induces a growth of Pa(i+1, t) by λ
a
i+1(t) > 0, and a decrease
of Pa(i− 1, t) by λ
a
i−1(t) < 0.
• As soon as Pa(i+1, t) exceeds Pa(i− 1, t) the decrease of Pa(i, t) begins, because of
λai (t) < 0.
• These phases are repeated again and again due to i ≡ i mod Sa (i.e. a “cyclical
sequence of the Sa attitudes”).
The above situation can occur, if the readiness to exchange the present attitude i for
the previous attitude (i − 1) is less than the readiness to exchange i for a new attitude
(i+ 1). After a finite number Sa of changes one may return to the original attitude, and
the process starts from the beginning. Typical examples are the behavior of consumers
(concerning fashion) or voters.
In figures 16 and 17 (A = 1), the solution of equation (55) for a varying number S1 of
attitudes is depicted. With growing S1, the temporal development of the fractions P1(i, t)
becomes more complex. For S1 = 5 attitudes, P1(i, t) looks already quite irregular (see
fig. 17). However, a phase plot1 illustrates that P1(i, t) is still periodic, since it shows a
1Here, the term phase plot has the meaning of a two-dimensional projektion of the trajectory
(P1(1, t), . . . , PA(SA, t)). For example, a plot of the value Pa(2, t) over the value Pa(1, t) with varying
time t would be a special case of a phase plot.
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closed curve (see fig. 18). A similar situation can be found for Sa = 6 attitudes (see fig.
19). For Sa = 7 even the phase plot appears irregular.
Let us return to figure 3, where two subpopulations periodically change between S1 = 4
resp. S2 = 3 attitudes with different frequencies independently of each other. The complex
ratio between these frequencies can be easily seen in the corresponding phase plot (see fig.
20: κ = κ00). However, if subpopulation a = 2 is influenced by subpopulation a = 1 (see
fig. 4), the phase plot differs drastically (see fig. 21: κ = κ01). Obviously, the oscillations
of P2(i, t) in subpopulation 2 have the same frequency as in subpopulation 1, then. This
remarkable adaption of frequency is called frequency locking.
5 Outlook
We have developed a model for attitude formation by pair interactions, which can be
written in the form
d
dt
Pa(i, t) =
∑
i′
[
wa(i, i′; t)Pa(i
′, t)− wa(i′, i; t)Pa(i, t)
]
(56)
with the effective transition rates
wa(i′, i; t) := Ra(i
′, i; t)
∑
b
[(
ν1ab(t)−ν
2
ab(t)
)
Pb(i, t)+ν
2
ab(t)+
(
ν3ab(t)−ν
2
ab(t)
)
Pb(i
′, t)
]
(57)
(see equations (27) and (28)). This model includes attitude changes by an avoidance
behavior, by a readiness for compromises and by persuasion. It also takes into account
different types of behavior by distinguishing several subpopulations a.
The model allows some modifications and generalizations, which shall be discussed in
forthcoming pubplications:
• Equations of type (17) can produce chaotic attitude changes (Helbing (1991c)), i.e.
a temporal behavior that is unpredictable, since it depends on the initial conditions
in a very sensible way (Schuster (1984), Hao (1984)).
• Other interesting effects are generated by spatial interactions in attitude formation
(Helbing (1991e)). Such spatial interactions may result from migration (Schweitzer
et. al. (1991), Weidlich & Haag (1988)) or by telecommunication.
• Attitude formation could be reformulated in a way that allows to understand at-
titude changes as a reaction on a social field (Helbing (1991c), Lewin (1951),
Spiegel (1961)).
• There are several plausible specifications of the readiness Ra(i
′, i; t) for attitude
changes from i to i′:
– In the model of this paper, assumptions (33) and (35) imply the relation
∑
i′
Ra(i
′, i; t) =
∑
i′(6=i)
(
1
Sa − 1
−Ra(i, i
′; t)
)
+Ra(i, i; t)
= 1− Pa,i(t) + Pa,i(t) = 1 , (58)
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and Ra(i
′, i; t) could be interpreted as the probability for an individual of
subpopulation a to change the attitude from i to i′ during a time interval
τa := 1/νa, where
νa(t) :=
∑
b
[(
ν1ab(t)− ν
2
ab(t)
)
Pb(i, t) + ν
2
ab(t) +
(
ν3ab(t)− ν
2
ab(t)
)
Pb(i
′, t)
]
. (59)
Obviously, τa depends on the rates of pair interactions of types k.
– Another plausible specification of Ra(i
′, i; t) is given by
Ra(i
′, i; t) :=
eUa(i
′,t)−Ua(i,t)
Da(i′, i; t)
(60)
with
Da(i
′, i; t) = Da(i, i
′; t) and Da(i
′, i, t) > 0 (61)
(compare to Weidlich & Haag (1983)). That means, the readiness Ra(i
′, i; t)
for an individual of type a to change the attitude from i to i′ will be the greater,
the greater the difference of the plausibilities (utilities) Ua of attitudes i
′ and i
is, and the smaller the incompatibility (distance) Da(i
′, i; t) of attitudes i and
i′ is.
The optimal specification of the model (56), (57) can only be found by evaluation
of empirical data.
• Therefore, methods have to be developed, which are able to determine the parame-
ters in the models from (complete or incomplete) empirical data (Helbing (1991b)).
• A quantitative model for the readiness Ra(i
′, i; t) to exchange an attitude i by an
attitude i′ may be developed, which calculates the value of Ra(i
′, i; t) as a function
of the relation of attitudes i and i′. Osgood and Tannenbaum’s (1955) congruity
principle, Heider’s (1946) balance theory and Festinger’s (1957) dissonance the-
ory have already found valuable results on this problem.
• The models treated in this paper can be generalized to the situation illustrated in
figure 22, where both pair interactions and indirect (mean field) interactions play
an important role. In that case, we have to use the transition rates
w(~n′, ~n; t) =

na~xw˜a(~x
′, ~x;~n; t) if ~n′ = ~na~x′
a
~x
na~xn
b
~yw˜ab(~x
′, ~y′; ~x, ~y;~n; t) if ~n′ = ~na~x′
b
~y′
a
~x
b
~y
0 else
(62)
when solving the master equation (8). The corresponding approximate equations for
the expected fractions Pa(~x, t) are, if (Na − 1)/Na ≈ 1:
d
dt
Pa(~x, t) =
∑
~x′
[
wa
(
~x, ~x′; 〈~n〉; t
)
Pa(~x
′, t)− wa
(
~x′, ~x; 〈~n〉; t
)
Pa(~x, t)
]
(63)
with
wa
(
~x′, ~x; 〈~n〉; t
)
:= wa
(
~x′, ~x; 〈~n〉; t
)
+
∑
b
∑
~y
∑
~y′
wab
(
~x′, ~y′; ~x, ~y; 〈~n〉; t
)
Pb(~y, t) , (64)
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wa := w˜a , wab := Nbw˜ab (65)
and
〈na~x〉 = NaPa(~x, t) . (66)
Equations (63), (64) are very general and enable a great spectrum of quantitative
models for social processes: Special cases of these equations are
– the logistic equation (Verhulst (1845), Pearl (1924), Montroll & Bad-
ger (1974)) and the Lotka-Volterra equation (Lotka (1920, 1956),Volterra
(1931), Goel, Maitra & Montroll (1971), Hallam (1986), Goodwin
(1967)) for population dynamics,
– the Fisher-Eigen equation (Fisher (1930), Eigen (1971), Feistel & Ebe-
ling (1989)) for the evolution of new (behavioral) strategies (Helbing (1991)),
– the gravity model (Ravenstein (1876), Zipf (1946)) for migration phenomena,
and
– the models ofWeidlich and Haag (Weidlich &Haag (1983, 1988),Weid-
lich (1972, 1991)).
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Figure 1: Indirect interactions mediated by a mean field for N = 3 individuals.
✫✪
✬✩
✫✪
✬✩
✫✪
✬✩
✲✛
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡✣✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡
✡✢ ❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏❪❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏
❏❫
Figure 2: Direct pair interactions for N = 3 individuals.
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Figure 3: Two subpopulations changing their attitudes with time t independently from
each other by persuasion. Subpopulation a = 1 (solid lines) changing periodically be-
tween 4 attitudes i, subpopulation a = 2 (broken lines) changing between 3 attitudes i
with a different frequency. (Sorry: Figure is not available as Postscript file. See original
publication.)
Figure 4: Due to asymmetric coupling, changes of attitudes in subpopulation 2 (broken
lines) depend on the attitude distribution in subpopulation 1. In contrast to this, subpop-
ulation 1 (solid lines) is not influenced by subpopulation 2. (Sorry: Figure is not available
as Postscript file. See original publication.)
Figure 5: Due to mutual coupling, each subpopulation influences attitude changes in the
other subpopulation. Periodic oscillations of different frequencies are destroyed. (Sorry:
Figure is not available as Postscript file. See original publication.)
Figure 6: The equilibrium fractions of attitudes grow with the preferences for them. All
types of interactions are taken into account. (Sorry: Figure is not available as Postscript
file. See original publication.)
Figure 7: Equal fractions of all attitudes result, if none of the attitudes is favoured. All
types of interactions are taken into account. (Sorry: Figure is not available as Postscript
file. See original publication.)
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Figure 8: Avoidance behavior of two subpopulations prefering the same attitude: Whereas
the fractions of the most prefered attitudes are decreasing, the factions of the least prefered
attitude (dotted line) is growing. (Sorry: Figure is not available as Postscript file. See
original publication.)
Figure 9: Avoidance behavior of two subpopulations prefering different attitudes: The
fraction of the most prefered attitude is growing (solid line). (Sorry: Figure is not available
as Postscript file. See original publication.)
Figure 10: Effects of persuasion and readiness for compromises in the case of two subpopu-
lations favouring the same attitude: Only the attitude with the highest preference survives
(solid line). (Sorry: Figure is not available as Postscript file. See original publication.)
Figure 11: Effects of persuasion and readiness for compromises in the case of two sub-
populataions favouring different attitudes: A certain fraction of individuals decides for a
compromise (dotted line). (Sorry: Figure is not available as Postscript file. See original
publication.)
Figure 12: Effects of persuasion in the case of two subpopulations favouring the same atti-
tude: Only the most prefered attitude survives (solid line). (Sorry: Figure is not available
as Postscript file. See original publication.)
Figure 13: Effects of persuasion in the case of two subpopulations favouring different at-
titudes: The attitude favoured by a subpopulation becomes the predominating one (solid
line), but the attitude which is favoured in the other subpopulation also wins a certain
fraction (broken line). (Sorry: Figure is not available as Postscript file. See original pub-
lication.)
Figure 14: Periodic oscillations are one possible effect of persuasion. Two mutually cou-
pled subpopulations are changing between 3 attitudes each with the same frequency and
amplitude. (Sorry: Figure is not available as Postscript file. See original publication.)
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Figure 15: Phase plots for periodic changes between 3 attitudes in one subpopulation: For
varying initial conditions different orbits result.
Figure 16: Periodic oscillations in a subpopulation changing between 4 attitudes by per-
suasion: Two different amplitudes of the oscillations appear. (Sorry: Figure is not available
as Postscript file. See original publication.)
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Figure 17: Oscillatory changes between 5 attitudes show a quite irregular temporal devel-
opment without short-term periodicity.
Figure 18: Phaseplot of oscillatory changes between 5 attitudes shaped like the surface of
a torus: A long-term periodicity is indicated by the closeness of the curve.
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Figure 19: Phaseplot of oscillatory changes between 6 attitudes indicating a longterm
periodicity.
Figure 20: Phaseplot for two subpopulations changing between 4 resp. 3 attitudes in-
dependently of each other in a periodic manner and with different frequencies. (Sorry:
Figure is not available as Postscript file. See original publication.)
Figure 21: Phaseplot showing an adaptation of frequency by subpopulation 2 (frequency
locking) as a consequence of the influence of subpopulation 1 on subpopulation 2. (Sorry:
Figure is not available as Postscript file. See original publication.)
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Figure 22: Indirect interactions mediated by a mean field and direct pair interactions for
N = 3 individuals.
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